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Long counted among Latin America's most stable and vibrant democracies, Costa Rica has now 
become a place where the once unimaginable happens. In just the past year, two former 
presidents of this Central American country of 4.3 million have been arrested on corruption 
charges, while a third has come under investigation. Voter turnout is dropping. Citizens are 
unhappy with the tone and content of public life. Agencies and boards responsible for policing 
the state seem to be working poorly. The public debt is growing to an unhealthy size. The party 
system, the link between citizens and the state, is disintegrating.  
 
If left to fester, these problems could lay the groundwork for a gradual political implosion. There 
will be no military coup because the 1949 constitution bans a standing army, and more 
importantly, because the vast majority of Costa Ricans reject violence as a means of settling 
political disputes. If the political class does not reform key institutions and procedures, however, 
the party system will be unable to renew itself. If politicians bicker and social consensus begins 
to fray, it is not far-fetched to imagine an irresponsible populist becoming influential. This 
prospect leaves many Costa Ricans fearing for the future of their country.  
 
A robust economy—real Gross Domestic Product was thought to be growing at a yearly rate of 
5.6 percent as recently as 2003—plus the political system's underlying strengths should permit a 
political recovery, but it is unlikely to be either quick or painless. Citizens must use their votes 
and other lawful means of influence to persuade the parties to embrace a raft of reforms. First, 
the parties need to start holding roll-call votes in the Assembly, a practice that they have resisted 
for decades, to be held accountable. [  
 
Next, the parties will need to overhaul their internal operations and rethink the ways in which 
they relate to society. This will involve getting politicians to hold public hearings on how they 
appoint the supervisory boards that run a large and complex state apparatus—an appointment 
process deliberately kept in the dark for decades. Getting the parties to transform largely 
ineffective campaign-finance laws will require party leaders to end the secrecy surrounding the 
manner in which they spend public as well as private campaign funds. Finally, getting the parties 
to build a consensus calling for tax hikes, spending cuts, or some combination of the two will 
force citizens and the state to begin choosing among and ranking goals and interests in a more 
coherent way.  
 
These and other accountability-enhancing reforms promise to rebuild the body politic, and by the 
same token will demand changes dramatic enough to generate opposition and conflict. Fear of a 
populist takeover will hopefully serve both to keep minds focused on the need for serious 
change, and help to spur the creation of strong institutional safeguards against corruption, 
influence-peddling, and the like.  
 
The degree to which such ills might be troubling Costa Rica hit home on 22 October 2004, when 
citizens were treated to the spectacle of former president Rafael Angel Calderón (1990–94) of 
the center-right Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) going to jail in handcuffs. He faced charges 
of having taken a US$450,000 kickback from a loan of almost $40 million that the Finnish 
government had made to Costa Rica's Social Security Institute in order to finance the Institute's 
purchase of medical equipment. Calderón's critics professed themselves unsurprised, as they had 
long complained that he shared the corrupt tendencies that these critics imputed to his father, 
who had been president back in the early 1940s. Moreover, La Nación of San José, the country's 
leading newspaper, had been reporting for months that the younger Calderón was a target of the 
Costa Rican general attorney's investigation into influence-peddling rackets.  
 
At any rate, a larger shock had come a week earlier. A former president of more recent vintage, 
Miguel Angel Rodríguez (1998–2002) also of the PUSC, had stepped down from his freshly 
assumed post as secretary-general of the Organization of American States (OAS) and had flown 
back to San José to face manacles and judicial detention on bribery charges. Rodríguez stands 
accused of having accepted a $1.2-million payoff from the giant French telecommunications firm 
Alcatel in order to help it win a large contract from ICE, Costa Rica's state-run electricity and 
communications company. Rodríguez boasts an impressive nonpolitical resume as an 
accomplished economist and successful businessman, which caused many to wonder how he had 
become involved in the ICE-Alcatel affair along with his close associate, ICE executive director 
José Antonio Lobo. Soon after, an investigative committee of the Assembly accused former 
president José Figueres, Jr., (1994–98) of influence-peddling. Figueres, a president from the 
center-left National Liberation Party (PLN), had been executive director of the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, since 2000. In October 2004, he was forced to resign when Forum 
officials learned that he had failed to report a large consulting fee that he had received from a 
private telecommunications firm. As of this writing in early June 2005, neither Rodríguez nor 
Calderón has been found guilty of any of the crimes for which they were detained, and both have 
been permitted house arrest. Nor is it clear what the Assembly will do with former president 
Figueres, who has refused to return to Costa Rica to defend himself.  
 
These high-profile investigations and arrests show that public prosecutors are taking their 
mandates seriously enough to enforce the rule of law. They also have political support for doing 
so: The Legislative Assembly and incumbent president Abel Pacheco of the PUSC furnished the 
general attorney's office with additional funding in November 2004. The anticorruption 
campaign has crystallized public discontent that has been manifesting itself in a variety of ways.  
 
Among these is falling turnout in elections, which in Costa Rica occur every four years and take 
place during the same calendar year to fill both the presidency and all the seats in the 57-member 
Legislative Assembly. While turnout in general elections had averaged around 80 percent for 
decades, in 1998 it took a 10 percent dip and stayed there in 2002. While Costa Rica's current 
turnout rate of around 70 percent is still comparatively robust, the decline in overall participation 
has not only been noticeable, but has gone hand-in-hand with a dramatic drop in the aggregate 
share of the popular vote that the two major party formations can claim. In the five elections held 
between 1982 and 1998, the PLN and the PUSC accounted for an average combined vote share 
of 92 percent. In 2002, by contrast, just 63 percent of voters supported one of those two parties.  
 
The average proportion of voters calling themselves independents, meanwhile, rose from a low 
of 17.1 percent during the presidency of Oscar Arias (1986–90) of the PLN to a high of 30.8 
under President Rodríguez (these figures are averages of quarterly polls done jointly by the 
Gallup organization and the Center for the Investigation of Democracy). After the 2002 
elections, the average "effective number" of parties in the legislature rose to 3.7 from a previous 
average of 2.5 that had held steady for most of the preceding five decades. In a December 2004 
survey, only 9 percent of respondents said that they were hoping for a PLN victory in the 2006 
elections, while an even smaller number (5 percent) said the same thing about the PUSC.
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Of all the political systems in Latin America, Costa Rica's is arguably one of the best.
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 The 2002 
average of the World Bank's six "governance indicators" places Costa Rica in the 77th 
percentile, some 22 percentile points higher than comparable countries in the region and 14 
points higher than the average country in Costa Rica's income category worldwide. The 2003 
Bertelsmann Management Index (BMI), a composite measure designed to rank a polity's ability 
to build agreements to solve social problems, ranks Costa Rica as the eighth most successful on a 
list of 116 developing countries. In Latin America, only Chile (third on the same list) and 
Uruguay (sixth) receive comparable ratings from the BMI.
3
  
 
Widely used indices of development also rank Costa Rica favorably. Between 1950 and 2000, 
the country's GDP per capita increased fourfold, going from $847 to $3,315 (both figures are in 
1990 U.S. dollars)—a stellar performance in a region where GDP per capita barely doubled 
during the same period. According to the World Bank's 2004 report on socioeconomic inequality 
in Latin America, Costa Rica maintained throughout the 1990s a Gini Index coefficient below 
0.45 (a Gini number of 0 signifies absolute equality of income distribution, while a 1 indicates 
absolute inequality). This means that Costa Rica, along with Uruguay, has one of the most level 
income distributions in Latin America.  
 
The Tican Achievement  
Costa Rica has had a competitive political system for more than a hundred years, and has been a 
democracy for almost the last fifty of those. Before the 1950s, hotly contested elections were 
often marred by force or fraud. Serious improvement began in the late 1940s, when incumbents 
and oppositionists finally agreed to strip both the executive and legislative branches of electoral-
supervision powers and instead made an independent court system solely responsible for 
organizing elections and tallying votes.
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The advent of full democracy (a system wherein all political forces can compete openly for 
elected office under conditions of universal adult suffrage) may fairly be dated to the late 1950s, 
when the losers of the 1948 civil war came back from exile and began running for office again. 
Since the 1958 presidential election, which saw the PLN incumbent reluctantly concede defeat, 
executives and legislators have come to power in elections that are held regularly every four 
years and are renowned for their openness and fairness.  
 
Between 1949 and 2002, average turnout exceeded 77 percent of the adult population. Not only 
have elections been fraud-free, but they also have been close and hard-fought. Between 1953 and 
1978, the PLN enjoyed something approaching hegemonic status. It lost the presidency only on 
the rare occasion when enough of its rivals got behind a joint ticket. After President Rodrigo 
Carazo (1978–82) of the Christian Unity party (a PUSC forerunner) defaulted on the country's 
foreign debt, the PLN won two elections in a row before starting to lose by narrow margins of 
little more than 3 percent or so between 1990 and 2002.  
 
Since 1936, Costa Rica has used a qualified form of majority rule to elect its president. This 
method requires the winner to obtain more votes than any single rival and to win at least 40 
percent of all valid votes cast. This encourages parties to seek the support of the median voter 
and to coalesce into two partisan blocs. My calculations suggest that the winner in all but three of 
the thirteen presidential races held since 1953 has been the candidate who appealed most 
successfully to the median voter—the voter at the exact center of the political spectrum.
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 The 40 
percent threshold spurs parties to work for large numbers of votes, which in turn fosters a two-
party system or something fairly close to it.  
 
This dynamic has meant the rise of a unified opposition to challenge the long-dominant PLN as a 
peer-competitor. The ascent of the PUSC to this role received an important boost under President 
Luis Alberto Monge in the early 1980s. Anxious to rally opposition legislators behind his 
emergency economic measures and structural reforms, Monge endorsed a change in the Electoral 
Code that allowed the recently formed PUSC to obtain the shares of public campaign financing 
owed to its constituent parties, which had run separate tickets in previous elections.  
 
The use of proportional representation (PR) to elect the Legislative Assembly produces a median 
deputy who more or less echoes the preferences of the median voter. Electoral laws based on PR 
principles ensure that a chamber consisting of 57 representatives elected in seven multimember 
districts reflects the views and diversity of tastes found in society at large. Along with the 
qualified majority-rule system for electing the president, the system of representation keeps 
elected officials relatively well-informed regarding changes in public opinion and political 
preferences.  
 
Political scientists have long admired Costa Rica as a case of successful presidential democracy. 
While there have been standoffs between the executive and legislative branches, these have 
never been the occasion for an autogolpe (executive coup) or other form of presidential assault 
on the political system. On the one hand, the practice of holding elections for president and all 57 
Assembly seats on the same day often gave voters an opportunity to choose legislative majorities 
sympathetic to the president's platform.  
 
On the other hand, however, the ban on consecutive terms for legislators as well as presidents 
means that legislative support for the executive tends to drop as general elections draw near. 
Term limits make lame ducks out of presidents by the third year of the four-year term as 
deputies, even from the progovernment party, distance themselves from the incumbent. 
Legislators focus instead on aligning themselves with a future president, hoping perhaps for a 
cabinet or senior bureaucratic post in the new administration, or for an advantage in the world of 
local government and politics.  
 
The electoral cycle helps to keep presidents weak. As legislative support for the presidential 
agenda dips, moreover, conflict between the elected branches of government becomes more 
likely. My own research shows that vetoes are more than twice as likely to occur during periods 
of divided government—12 percent of the time versus less than 5 percent during periods of 
unified government. Similar work shows that during the last year of a term, presidential bills 
often fail even to make it out of committee.
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A relatively even distribution of powers between the elected branches of government, along with 
"fast-track" budget procedures, means that the scope for confrontation is limited. The president 
has no power to call referenda on his own and only restricted decree-issuing powers. The 1949 
constitution also lays down special budget-enacting procedures that prevent both branches from 
holding the budget hostage. The executive must submit a budget by September 1, and the 
Assembly must pass one within ninety days after that date. While the legislature can amend the 
budget bill, the executive cannot veto it—the sole exception to the president's ability to apply 
this check to legislative acts.  
 
Among the most remarkable features of the Costa Rican political system is the degree to which it 
gives important policy-making responsibilities to a set of autonomous institutions. Health care, 
old-age pensions, monetary policy, and electoral supervision are among the policy areas under 
the purview of bodies whose budgets the executive does not propose and the legislature does not 
approve. Many have earmarked sources of funding so that, for example, payroll deductions 
finance health care and old-age pensions while telephone and utilities charges fund ICE, the 
Costa Rican Institute of Electricity. In terms of their size, the more than a hundred autonomous 
institutes (which include state-owned banks) control monies rivaling the central state apparatus 
(the three branches of government plus the Supreme Tribunal of Elections). The judiciary, 
independent under the 1949 constitution, has since 1989 featured a Constitutional Chamber that 
has become an assertive interpreter of the powers that each branch of government possesses as 
well as an arbiter of the boundaries between them.
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The Roots of Political Decay  
Perhaps the seminal event of modern Costa Rican political history was President Carazo's 1982 
decision to default on the national debt. His government's refusal to let the exchange rate float at 
a time of burgeoning fiscal and trade deficits had caused public indebtedness to more than 
double in just a year, going from a sum equivalent to 56.2 percent of annual GDP in 1980 to one 
equaling 125.2 percent of GDP in 1981. Restoring Costa Rica's credit required an export-led 
development policy that rendered meaningless most skirmishing between the left-leaning PLN 
and its right-of-center adversaries. By the 1990s, an increasingly educated and urban electorate 
began to demand more transparency and accountability from the recent development of a two-
party system, one that had begun to collude against the public interest in various ways, even as 
debt-servicing obligations straitjacketed the government's ability to address deep social problems 
or to invest for future growth.  
 
 
 
By 2002, voters had had enough. That year, a breakaway PLN faction called the Citizen Action 
Party (PAC) took 25 percent of the legislative vote. Then, for the first time since 1936, no 
presidential candidate met the 40 percent threshold and a runoff had to be held. In total, parties 
aligned with neither the PLN nor the PUSC obtained 37 percent of the vote and a like share of 
seats in the 2002 Assembly elections. (See the table above.)  
 
Dissatisfaction with the political establishment surfaced in several ways. The first was a decline 
in expressed support for the political system (not to be confused with democracy as such) in 
opinion polls.
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 On a scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high), support for the political system peaked at 6.7 
in 1983 before falling steadily and reaching 5.5 in 1999. The second sign of discontent was the 
already discussed phenomenon of falling turnout. Finally, in surveys spanning 2001 and 2002, 
only 7.8 percent of respondents between 17 and 25 years of age, and only 36.9 percent of older 
adults, were willing to approve Costa Rica's two-decade-old two-party system.
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In an economically dynamic society with better-schooled and better-informed voters than ever 
before, traditional party leaders have been slow to keep pace. Until the 1990s, they saw to it that 
nominating conventions for legislative candidates were largely ceremonial. Presidential 
primaries began in 1978, but neither of the two big parties adopted legislative primaries. While 
the Electoral Code calls for party caucuses at the district, cantonal, and provincial levels to 
choose candidates, these meetings were easily subjected to manipulation. The Supreme Tribunal 
of Elections did not even begin sending monitors until 1988, and then only to each party's 
provincial and national caucus meetings (Costa Rica has 7 provinces, 81 cantons, and 510 
districts).  
 
The PUSC has done a smoother job of integrating democratic elements into its candidate-
selection process. While both parties hold presidential primaries, followed by party conventions 
tasked with approving legislative candidates that the presidential nominees choose in conjunction 
with other party notables, the PLN has found itself riven by factional disputes over how large a 
candidate-selection role rank-and-file members should play. Before the 1998 elections, PLN 
reformers publicly fought the party's leadership all the way to the Constitutional Court over this 
issue. The PUSC, by contrast, suffered no such rifts. Its leaders modified their closed-list system 
in 1995 by requiring all legislative nominees to obtain at least 40 percent support within 
cantonal—or municipal—assemblies in order to be eligible for nomination by the national 
convention.  
 
The recent decay of the two-party system has made governance much more complicated than 
before. The qualified-majority system for choosing the president may have bred a centrism so 
bland that it has alienated large chunks of voters who wish to see the parties advocate sharper 
agendas. By the early 1990s, the complaint that the PLN and PUSC were mirroring each other 
had become a common refrain. Many citizens felt unrepresented by either, and wanted more say 
in choosing candidates as well as a system more open to new ways of dealing with large issues 
such as the national debt. In a more educated society, personalism could not fill the ideological 
void as fully as it once had, not least because the old days of personalismo were also a time of 
fairly sharp ideological debate between the PLN and its rivals.  
 
The Failure of Horizontal Accountability  
Much of what the Costa Rican state does goes on outside of executive ministries. Creating the 
decentralized sector or the autonomous institutions was part of the 1949 Constituent Assembly's 
broader effort to remove as much as possible of the functions of the modern state from the 
partisanship of the elected branches of government. Thanks to this sector, virtually the entire 
population enjoys basic services including health care, higher education, water, and 
telecommunications. Autonomous institutions have programmatic and budgetary autonomy; they 
often have specific or protected revenue sources and their annual budgets require neither 
executive nor legislative approval.  
 
By the mid-1990s, there were more than 118 such autonomous institutions. Unlike the three 
branches of government and the electoral tribunal, their budgets are not part of the central state 
budget. Only the Office of the Comptroller General checks their budget to make sure that they 
are complying with the law. These bodies include state corporations (though not all state 
corporations are autonomous institutes) and a host of agencies charged with fulfilling an array of 
ambitious development objectives.  
 
Perhaps the most prominent of these is the Board of National Social Security, founded in 1943. 
By the 1990s, this institution had come to be the primary provider of medical care to nearly 68 
percent of the salaried and unsalaried economically active population and their families. Other 
important autonomous institutes include the now scandal-tinged ICE, which has provided 
electricity and telephone service since its founding in 1949. In 1950, the combined budgets of 
such bodies equaled 7.3 percent of GDP. By 1994, that figure was probably close to 20 
percent—as much as central government spending at the time.
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By the 1960s, politicians were becoming concerned that such a large portion of the state budget 
was outside their control. Beginning in 1968, the Assembly passed a series of constitutional 
changes that left the administrative autonomy of these bodies intact while abolishing their ability 
to exempt themselves from state directives concerning the governance of the public sector as a 
whole. A 1970 law cut the terms of these bodies' board members from seven to five years and 
allowed each new Costa Rican president to name only four out of seven board members for each 
body (rather than all seven, as before) while handing the right to appoint the remaining three to 
the party that finished second in the presidential race. In 1974, the president received the power 
to name chief executives for many of these decentralized agencies.  
 
Yet by the 1980s, there were good reasons to ask whether bipartisan collusion had undercut the 
institutional mechanisms for ensuring that these agencies were fulfilling their mandates. As 
differences between the PLN and the PUSC eroded, they began to collude at the task of 
colonizing the autonomous bodies with their respective loyalists. The board seats and 
presidential offices of these bodies began to fill up with former deputies, ambassadors, and 
mayors; campaign contributors; and members of the president's coterie. Often these people had 
little or no experience at or interest in running complex bureaucracies, or worse yet, displayed 
serious conflicts of interest.  
 
The effects of flawed mechanisms of horizontal accountability are perhaps best illustrated by the 
case of the Anglo–Costa Rican Bank (BAC), the country's oldest fiduciary financial institution. 
One study shows how anxious the BAC's supervisory board had become by the 1980s to shield 
itself and its appointee, the bank manager, from outside scrutiny.
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 The BAC repeatedly refused 
requests for information from the office of the General Auditor of Financial Entities, another 
decentralized institution. The auditor's staff had wanted to look into matters such as the BAC's 
unprecedented and illegal incorporation of part of itself in Panama, its loans to influential PLN 
and PUSC figures, its illicit loans to political campaigns, and its purchase of dubious Venezuelan 
bonds. When the scale of the bad loans that the BAC was carrying became public knowledge, 
depositors began fleeing in panic until the president and the Assembly stepped in to halt the 
losses by closing the bank's doors and liquidating its assets in 1994. According to the Economic 
Commission of Latin America, handling this foreclosure caused Costa Rica's fiscal deficit to 
expand by 14 percent.  
 
The Office of the Comptroller General is the watchdog which, on behalf of the Assembly, guards 
the executive branch and the autonomous bodies alike. While nobody questions the 
professionalism of the comptroller's staff, neither the Assembly nor the comptroller's office is 
known for being an aggressive guardian of the public interest. The latter in particular has run into 
criticism for taking an overly narrow, bookkeeperish view of its duties. One study, for instance, 
documents how little both the comptroller's office and the Supreme Tribunal of Elections do to 
verify the accuracy of the receipts that parties submit for reimbursement under the laws 
establishing public campaign financing. On the fairly rare occasions when parties are caught with 
their books out of order, the study further shows, the comptroller does little to penalize them.
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These case studies reveal why Costa Ricans are so upset with their country's political class. 
Despite the widespread and somewhat reasonable assumption that Costa Rican public life is 
honest by world and regional standards, hard evidence to support this notion is hard to find. 
What is clear is that Costa Ricans believe their public officials are corrupt: According to surveys, 
75 percent of Costa Ricans believe that corruption is somewhat or very generalized among public 
officials. This is the highest rate among the five Central American countries plus Colombia, 
Mexico, and Panama, even though Costa Rica ties with Colombia for the lowest share of 
respondents (15 percent) who say that they have experienced at least one act of corruption per 
year.
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Crippling Fiscal Deficits  
Renewing a bankrupt party system and improving horizontal accountability will prove tasks 
complex enough to keep officials busy for years. Unfortunately, they must make these repairs to 
a ship of state that is tossing on increasingly turbulent waters while running dangerously low on 
fuel. Though the public sector no longer has a huge external debt with which to contend, it is 
running short of funds just when it needs them to rebuild itself.  
 
While the Costa Rican government has always run a fiscal deficit, prudent monetary policy and 
positive capital-account inflows from 1961 to 1980 kept the public debt at slightly less than a 
quarter of annual GDP, well below the 60 percent ceiling recommended for developing 
economies. Consumer-service charges levied by autonomous agencies such as the Social 
Security Institute and the Water Commission partly offset low tax yields. Around the time of the 
1982 debt default, however, the deficit was beginning a sharp upsurge that would see it balloon 
as high as 96 percent of GDP before falling below 60 percent again in 1992.
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Underlying these fiscal problems is the awkward and hard-to-sustain situation of a society that is 
trying to provide its people with first-class social programs on the basis of a rickety Third World 
tax system. The lack of serious policy dispute between the two major parties only makes the 
problem worse by obscuring it. Costa Rica has a public sector (meaning the "regular" central and 
municipal levels of government plus the autonomous bodies) that consistently spends far more 
than 15 percent of GDP, but which (like most developing-world states) can never manage to 
collect more than 12 or 13 percent of that same GDP in the form of tax revenues. The demands 
of meeting the resulting shortfall every year have led officials to cut public investment and the 
public payroll, as well as contract series of internal and foreign debts that by 2003 totaled close 
to 60 percent of annual GDP. Currently, almost a third of the money that the central government 
spends goes to pay the interest on the public debt.
15
 
 
Incumbent president Abel Pacheco commissioned an independent report on fiscal reform soon 
after taking office in 2002, and in 2003 managed to get a reform bill introduced in the Assembly. 
It remains there, unenacted, at the time of this writing in early June 2005. Until the government 
and the citizens agree on decisive action to improve tax-collection rates and pay for public 
services, increasing numbers of voters will see their policy demands go unfulfilled and have yet 
another set of reasons to punish parties at the polls.  
 
What Might the Future Bring?  
While the ex-presidential scandals may have thrust Costa Rica into world headlines for a day or 
two, the country is more often taken for granted as a peaceful, democratic Third World success 
story. But whatever the outcome of the cases against the onetime chief executives, the scandals 
have made it obvious that not all is well in Costa Rica.  
 
While the country's political system has reserves of strength, public opinion is correct to sense 
that the body politic is deeply ailing. An innovative political architecture, one that delegates 
many functions of the central state to institutions which are largely independent of the executive 
and legislative branches of government, has succumbed to bipartisan cronyism and bureaucratic 
inertia. The two major parties are losing their grip because they have failed to open up 
sufficiently. And neither citizens nor officials have taken seriously enough the effects on basic 
public services (a key part of governance) or long-term macroeconomic health of a fiscal policy 
devoted to spending without adequate revenue collection to pay the bills.  
 
What is going to happen? One possible scenario is bleak: The two-party system will completely 
disappear with the 2006 elections. The Assembly will become more political novices.  
Disagreements between the executive and the legislature will paralyze policymaking. Public 
support for the political system will continue to fade. There will be no political consensus behind 
any particular combination of spending cuts, tax hikes, and measures to improve tax collection. 
The size of the public debt will continue to grow and servicing it will consume an ever-larger 
share of stagnant revenues. Public-sector strikes will further degrade the quality of public 
services. Economic growth will droop, as will investment. With some changes, this is essentially 
the same route that led to the collapse of democracy in Uruguay in 1973 and to its implosion in 
contemporary Venezuela.  
 
There is some evidence for this scenario. In mid-2000, university students, ICE workers, and 
other public-sector employees paralyzed the country with a strike designed to block reform of the 
ICE. Protestors claimed that the government was planning to privatize the Commission. 
President Rodríguez's administration argued that the ICE-workers' union was preventing changes 
necessary to make electricity and telecommunications more competitive.
16
 With the breakup of 
the PAC in 2004, the effective number of parties is now more than four. The 2006 elections will 
very likely return an equally fragmented party system to the Assembly. This will both increase 
the representativeness of the Assembly, but will also—at least until the key players learn to 
adapt—slow the policy-making process. When public-sector works staged a fresh wave of strikes 
in mid-2004, President Pacheco's decision to meet their wage demands led his finance minister to 
resign and fiscal reform to stall yet again.  
 
An alternative scenario is that stress and even crisis will spur a political renewal built on a 
different party system. This is not the first time that Costa Rica's political model has come under 
severe strain. Polarization and institutional breakdown sparked the 1948 civil war, but without 
that conflict the transformation embodied in the 1949 constitution would probably never have 
occurred. The 1982 debt default led to a major reorientation in development strategy and the rise 
of the now nearly dead two-party system. Two decades after that economic collapse, citizens are 
demanding an overhaul of the systems of representation and horizontal accountability.  
 
Costa Rica's people and politicians have shown in the past that they can learn from mistakes and 
rebuild their political system. So far, that system—or at least its character as a law-governed 
democracy—retains the support of its citizens. There is no support for authoritarian solutions; 
according to Latinobarómetro surveys, Costa Ricans still overwhelmingly favor democracy.
17
 
Nor is the political system wholly deaf to changing popular preferences and expectations. While 
efforts to democratize the PLN and PUSC candidate-selection processes may have met mostly 
with disappointment so far, the larger push to deepen citizen participation remains a going 
concern.  
 
Indeed, this new stress on finding a more active role for people to play in their own governance 
may be the single most important and understudied development in contemporary Costa Rican 
politics.
18
 Both parties have supported municipal decentralization as well as community 
participation, and continue to tinker with their methods for choosing Assembly candidates. 
Moreover, the use of proportional representation in elections for the Assembly allows 
disgruntled citizens to give third parties a chance to rectify political problems.  
 
Already, the Assembly has begun to respond. In late October 2004, it passed Costa Rica's first 
law specifically aimed at fighting public corruption. Also in late 2004, legislators voted to 
dismiss Comptroller General Alex Solís for having forged the signatures of relatives (with their 
consent) on checks. This is a sign that Costa Rican politicians may be ready to demand nothing 
but the highest behavior from each other. A healthy next step would be for the Assembly to 
overhaul the procedure for choosing the top executives and board members of the autonomous 
bodies. The Assembly also needs to hold roll-call votes to improve transparency and political 
accountability. It needs to enact new campaign-finance legislation to restore faith in discredited 
parties. Most importantly, it needs to initiate an ample and thorough debate about how to raise 
chronically low tax rates and what the priorities of state spending should be.  
 
In what may turn out to be a significant contrast with Uruguay in the early 1970s and Venezuela 
today, Costa Rica is currently enjoying real gains in national wealth. Behind the growth, 
moreover, lies an open and well-diversified economy and a society that can protect and increase 
incomes. An equally autonomous society should also be able to demand that citizens take part in 
modernizing their own political system.  
 
For advocates of serious political renewal, the crucial date may be 2006, the year of the next 
general elections. President Pacheco, who cannot run again, has proven a passive figure who 
mostly seems to watch rather than shape events. His poll ratings and legislative support are 
anemic. Some observers have criticized him for taking the eccentric position that he will not send 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) to the Assembly until he is convinced 
that all Costa Ricans will benefit from the accord and until the Assembly adopts a fiscal-reform 
package. Meanwhile, the rest of Central America is approving CAFTA.  
 
In retrospect, the Costa Rican political system has displayed glaring weaknesses as well as 
notable strengths. Along with typically favorable cross-national comparisons, a dearth of 
systematic research made it all too easy to overfocus on the strengths and underfocus on the 
weaknesses. After half a century of conflict and debate, incumbents and opposition movements 
did create a full-blown democracy. The country's hierarchically organized and closed political 
parties, while they have now shown themselves no longer functional for an educated and 
demanding electorate, did nonetheless ease the way to constructive long-term agreements on key 
aspects of development policy. The ease of relations between the parties, however, also opened 
the door to partisan collusion and violations of the public interest, as the recent scandals show. 
Reasonable levels of economic growth and the resilience of the political system should permit a 
slow and hard-fought political recovery. If things go especially well, politicians and citizens may 
even learn how to create effective institutional safeguards against corruption and influence-
peddling, to name two of the most serious afflictions affecting political systems in less-
developed and unequal societies.  
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Getting Costa Rica Right 
 
By: Miguel Angel Rodriguez Echeverria 
 
Article Reply: ―Getting Costa Rica Right,‖ Vol. 17, No. 2 (2006): 161-164. 
 
Fabrice Lehoucq's July 2005 essay in these pages, "Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt," analyzes the 
deterioration of politics and political parties in Costa Rica over the last 15 years. In the last 
paragraph of the article, Lehoucq concludes:  
 
The country's hierarchically organized and closed political parties, while they have now shown 
themselves no longer functional for an educated and demanding electorate, did nonetheless ease 
the way to constructive long-term agreements on key aspects of development policy. The ease of 
relations between the parties, however, also opened the door to partisan collusion and violations 
of the public interest, as the recent scandals show.
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This hypothesis has a fundamental problem. If the Costa Rican system worked well up until 
about 1990 (Lehoucq does not give an exact date, but this is the drift of his analysis) and has 
deteriorated since, surely the cause must be something that began to exert its effect around that 
time. To cite the ability of the two major political groupings regularly to reach agreements on 
policy and to implement such agreements in the Legislative Assembly is to name a peculiar 
culprit. How can something that had been present for many decades suddenly become the cause 
of recent problems? Moreover, if the "ease of relations between the parties" leads to collusion, 
corruption, and political deterioration, how can we explain the relative health and effectiveness 
of the political systems in the United States, Great Britain, and many other European countries? 
Surely, one cannot postulate a hypothesis to explain one case and neglect its counterfactual 
implications for other cases. In fact, I would argue precisely the opposite—namely, that it has 
been precisely the failure of the two main political parties to reach and implement agreements 
that has caused Costa Rica's recent political problems.  
 
Until the early 1990s, agreements between the two main political organizations in Costa Rica—
one essentially Social Democratic and the other Christian Democratic—kept the system 
functioning well. The signs of success included an illiteracy rate that dropped from 21.2 percent 
in 1953 to 6.1 percent in 1990, an incidence of infant mortality that fell from 90.2 per thousand 
births to 14.8 per thousand over the same period; an average life expectancy that shot up from 
55.6 to 74 years; pensions that went from covering almost no workers to covering almost half the 
workforce; and health-insurance coverage that became universal.
2
 To a significant degree, these 
achievements rested on a rule that allowed two-thirds of the Assembly to end debate on a 
measure and put it to a vote. Of equal importance, during much of this period party leaderships 
were strong—in no small part because the possibility of reelection helped to lend them 
continuity—and they could make deals that would let the governing party reach a final vote on 
major legislation.  
 
The 1969 constitutional amendment that banned presidents from immediate reelection and 
banned legislators from serving consecutive terms sapped this deal-making capacity, while a 
1981 change in the Assembly's procedures ended the power of a two-thirds majority to force a 
vote. At first this meant little. Center-left governments from the Party of National Liberation 
(PLN) were in office from 1982 to 1990, during which time the center-right Social Christian 
Unity Party (PUSC) was in the process of forming out of what had previously been a coalition. 
Conditions for interparty collaboration were strong—the PUSC's leaders needed PLN support for 
changes in the electoral code that would make PUSC unity viable—and cooperation extended so 
far that PUSC legislators cast the votes needed to pass several of the difficult and often 
unpopular structural reforms that stabilized the economy and reignited growth after the 1981 
debt crisis. While those measures were consistent with the ideological principles and pragmatic 
proposals of PUSC, it is hard to imagine such considerations mattering in today's harsher 
political climate. Clearly, the "ease of relations" between the parties during the 1980s was crucial 
in enabling the PUSC to support the economic agenda of PLN governments.  
 
During the presidency of the PUSC's Rafael Angel Calderon (1990–94), the institutional changes 
of the previous years began to make their full influence felt. It was also during this period that 
the new Constitutional Court began to enforce formal Assembly procedures, including the 1981 
changes, which had previously often been ignored in practice.  
 
With reelection banned, the struggle for the top spot in each party has become constant and 
consuming. While Lehoucq is correct to point out that the need to attract at least 40 percent of 
the popular vote in order to win the presidency encourages a focus on the median voter 
nationwide,
3
 this does not apply to leadership elections within each party. Instead, internal 
competition within a center-left party tends to give an edge to partisans who tilt left, making it 
risky for politicians who want that party's presidential nomination to make concessions to center-
right proposals. This dynamic explains why Costa Rica, which the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) considered an "early reformer" in the 1980s, saw the PLN kill "structural 
adjustment" in the 1990s. From 1994 to 1998, PUSC legislators again lent their support to such 
unpopular measures as streamlining the teachers' pension system, only to see the PLN, moving 
left in the midst of the inevitable leadership struggle, undercut the PLN administration of 
President José Figueres, Jr.  
 
While I was president from 1998 to 2002, I tried to circumvent the partisan wrangling in the 
Assembly by means of a national consensus-building process known as the Concertación. While 
this approach of working with civil society at first seemed to be succeeding, it hit a wall when 
public-employee unions, university students, some individuals within the Catholic Church, small 
left-wing parties, and the more extreme social-democratic sectors of the PLN mobilized popular 
opposition against the idea of opening up public-sector monopolies in telecommunications and 
electric power. Worried PLN legislators responded to this pressure by withdrawing their support 
from most of the reforms that the Concertación process had already approved. The political costs 
associated with an intraparty power struggle were too large for moderates among PLN elected 
officials to face.  
 
This is all very different from what Lehoucq argues. The increasing difficulty of achieving 
interparty agreements and the impossibility of getting the Assembly to vote are the barriers that 
stand in the way of accelerated structural reform and hence of improved prospects for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. New parties have been emerging since 2002 primarily because of 
struggles within the PLN and the Left more broadly.  
 
Lehoucq is right to say that better-educated voters will demand more sophisticated platforms 
from parties. But this cannot be the whole story; otherwise, why would the political parties not 
respond to such a challenge? It is also true that, with the end of the Cold War, ideology has 
become less important as a determinant of party affiliation and voting behavior. Political debates 
now revolve around mundane matters such as police efficiency, education, social security, and 
health care. These are complex technical issues that force politicians to deliver a different 
message. It is no longer enough simply to wave the flag of freedom and democracy; details must 
be explained, which can be hard to do while remaining popular and attractive to the electorate. 
But again, this cannot be the explanation for the deterioration of the political climate in Costa 
Rica, for the same evolution has taken place in other countries without a similar slippage being 
observed.  
 
Finally, I also agree with Lehoucq that Costa Rica needs new laws and institutions better suited 
to meeting the expectations of our fellow citizens and the other demands of the new political age 
in which we find ourselves. This is why in 2001 I proposed a constitutional reform that would 
have moved us from a presidential to a semipresidential system. My hope in suggesting this 
change was to force an alignment between the executive and legislative branches that would be 
strong enough to break the impasse which currently exists between competing political 
groupings. Taking up this reform proposal again would represent a good start toward answering 
the political challenges that Costa Rica faces today.  
 
Miguel Angel Rodríguez Echeverría served as president of Costa Rica from 1998 to 2002, 
having been elected on the ticket of the Social Christian Unity Party. He was secretary-general 
of the Organization of American States from June to October 2004.  
 
Endnotes  
1. Fabrice Lehoucq, "Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt," Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005): 152. 
Among the examples of "recent scandals," Lehoucq mentions the criminal investigation that I 
currently face. I have no quarrel with that, but feel that a few comments are in order. Readers 
should understand that, as of this writing in February 2006, no prosecutor has filed any formal 
charges against me. I still do not know what if any charges will be presented in court, or when 
this will occur. The only "evidence" against me is the testimony of José Antonio Lobo, a person 
who has already confessed to corruption and dishonesty while a member of the Board of 
Directors of ICE, the power and telecommunications government company that had awarded the 
contract. In late 2004, I resigned my post as secretary-general of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and voluntarily returned to Costa Rica in order to defend myself in court, 
informing the attorney-general's office of my desire to refute any charges against me. Readers 
should also know, finally, about the gross violations of my constitutional and legal rights that I 
have suffered. Against the express limitation established by the court not to detain me until I had 
completed my term as secretary-general of the OAS, I was arrested while still holding that post. 
In clear violation of my human rights, I was considered guilty before trial. On my return, I was 
subjected to illegal psychological torture, public exhibition, and cruel treatment. As the Judicial 
Inspection Office has confirmed, the Office of the Prosecutor has illegally violated the 
confidentiality of the investigation procedures and has furnished them repeatedly to the press so 
as to make me appear guilty. Notwithstanding my voluntary resignation and return, I was in jail 
and under house arrest for a year with no valid reason.  
2. It is important to note that, notwithstanding the difficult political circumstances, Costa Rica 
continued to make significant accomplishments between 1990 and 2002. Economic growth was 
stronger than it was in the rest of Latin America, with growth in export income and foreign direct 
investment particularly robust. Moreover, poverty, infant mortality, and illiteracy continued to 
fall while life expectancy rose. Finally, the country enacted substantial reforms in the areas of 
social security and social policy, including laws promoting the rights of labor and the duties of 
responsible fatherhood.  
3. Fabrice Lehoucq, "Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt," 144.  
 
 
  
Exchange:  Different Times, Different Demands  
 
By: Fabrice Lehoucq  
 
Article Reply. ―Different Times, Different Demands,‖ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2 
(April 2006): 165-7). 
 
I am flattered that former Costa Rican president Miguel Angel Rodríguez (1998–2002) has 
written a comment on my essay about his country's political travails. His standing as an 
important economist, together with his longtime involvement in the public affairs of his country, 
makes his observations of great interest. I hope that his comment is a harbinger of a political 
memoir of his involvement in public affairs.  
 
President Rodríguez claims that my argument is self-contradictory. While I credit the party 
system with producing the agreements that have helped the country, for example, to increase its 
GDP per capita threefold since the 1950s, I also indict that same party system for being unable to 
continue forging agreements to solve development problems by the 1990s. "How can something 
that had been present for many decades," President Rodríguez quite reasonably asks, "suddenly 
become the cause of recent problems?"  
 
President Rodríguez's reflections are especially relevant because something clearly has gone 
awry in Costa Rica. To begin with, the legislature's ability to pass laws in a reasonably 
expeditious fashion ("legislative productivity") has fallen to long-term lows during the minority 
government of President Abel Pacheco (2002–2006), even once we control for the way in which 
the ban on consecutive terms leads to the productivity-sapping decay of presidential powers by 
the third year of the political cycle.  
 
Moreover, bureaucratic agencies are not performing very well. Social policy has been unable to 
reduce the share of Costa Ricans living in poverty, which has stayed at around 20 percent of the 
population since the mid-1980s. While the public-health system did manage to lower infant-
mortality rates to developed-world levels by the 1970s, it is been much less successful at 
providing more advanced health care on a timely basis. Though Costa Rica's development 
performance remains superior by developing-world standards, the country's ability to maintain 
and build upon past successes is in doubt. In 2005, the World Economic Forum ranked Costa 
Rica as having the 64
th
 most competitive economy in the world, a fall of 14 places since 2004. 
The 2006 Bertelsmann Management Index, a composite measure of the ability of a political 
system to forge consensus, has Costa Rica slipping from 8
th
 to 19
th
 place since 2003.  
 
While no single factor is responsible for the political system's decline, some factors are more 
influential than others. The deterioration of policy-making effectiveness flows from a profound 
crisis of political representation, one that institutional weaknesses also fuel (and that less than 
impressive economic-growth rates do not help). There is nothing contradictory about recognizing 
that, in the aftermath of the 1948 civil war and the politically turbulent decade of the 1950s, 
agreement among party elites laid the basis for several decades of sustained growth and that, by 
the 1990s, the hierarchically organized party system was no longer conducive to effective policy 
making in a radically changed society.  
 
As my essay explained, the party system that a previously less educated and more rural electorate 
had unabashedly supported between the 1950s and the 1970s was becoming increasingly 
unpopular by the 1990s. From the mid-1980s to the early 2000s, the share of independents 
among registered voters more than doubled, going from 17 to 40 percent. President Rodríguez's 
PUSC obtained less than 4 percent of the vote in the February 2006 elections, while newly 
elected President Oscar Arias of the PLN, who barely cleared the 40 percent threshold needed for 
a first-round win, will have to work hard to prevent his own party from suffering a similar fate in 
a multiparty Assembly.  
 
Narrow local interests continue to dominate internal party affairs enough to inhibit the parties' 
ability to act as effective transmission belts between citizens and the state. The failure of parties 
to modernize and to open up policy making (the lack of roll-call votes, among other things, 
makes it hard to hold deputies accountable) helps to explain why Costa Ricans hold their 
political class in such low regard. Indeed, the recent scandals that landed two former presidents 
in jail are nothing more than the climax of a political narrative that citizens and the state have 
been writing for more than a decade.  
 
Declining legislative productivity has much more to do with this crisis of political representation 
than it has to do with 1981 procedural changes that President Rodríguez so insightfully 
discusses. Eliminating the ability of a two-thirds majority in the Assembly to end debate and to 
call for a vote on an issue has undoubtedly made reaching agreements harder. Indeed, this rule—
along with the ability of ten or so deputies to ask the Constitutional Court to judge the 
constitutionality of any bill—empowers partisan minorities to obstruct lawmaking. This is 
especially true in fragmented legislatures, which, as the 2002 and 2006 legislative results 
confirm, are here to stay in Costa Rica.  
 
Yet this rule did not prevent President Rodríguez from reaching an agreement with the 
opposition PLN to open up telecommunications and electricity to private-sector involvement in 
2000. What unfortunately killed these far-reaching reforms (known as "Combo 2000") was that 
the public never really supported them. The existence of a bipartisan agreement "to betray the 
national interest," as street protesters must have phrased it, only confirmed to many citizens how 
out of touch their political class was with their concerns.  
 
In retrospect, Combo 2000 symbolically marks the end of the post–civil war style of policy 
making, in which the political class made decisions (many of them good ones) behind closed 
doors and with support but not necessarily much input from the citizenry. Indeed, the Rodríguez 
administration's use of extralegislative committees to build consensus among NGOs, interest 
groups, and ordinary citizens marks an important (and welcome) shift toward a more open and 
participatory style of policy making.  
 
One final point: I share the grief of many Costa Ricans that a remarkable man landed in jail 
because of accusations of bribe-taking made by a former confidant. In my article, I made it clear 
that no court has yet convicted President Rodríguez of any charges. To his credit, he resigned his 
post as secretary-general of the Organization of American States in order to voluntarily return to 
his country to face these accusations. I wish him (and Costa Rica) a fair and speedy trial plus the 
best of luck.  
 
